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Endogenous Capacities and Price Competition: The Role of 
Demand Uncertainty 
This paper analyzes a model of capacity choice followed by price competition 
under demand uncertainty. Under various assumptions regarding the nature 
and timing of demand realizations, we obtain general predictions concerning 
the role of demand uncertainty on equilibrium outcomes. We show that it 
reduces the multiplicity of equilibria, it may rule out the existence of symmetric 
equilibria, and it leads to endogenous capacity asymmetries even though firms 
are ex-ante symmetric. Furthermore, as compared to the certainty equivalent 
game, demand uncertainty reduces prices and increases consumer surplus, 
but it also decreases total welfare because of the emergence of idle capacity. 
By relying on the analysis of firms' reaction functions as well as on the theory 
of submodular games, we are able to show that a subgame perfect equilibrium 
always exists and to fully characterize it. 
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1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze the effect of introducing demand uncertainty into a model of capacity
investments followed by price competition in the product market. In particular, we assume
that Þrms are uncertain about future demand conditions at the investment stage, but are
able to observe realized demand prior to competing in prices. We characterize the subgame
perfect equilibria of the game under two approaches regarding demand uncertainty, which
is modelled as either a discrete or as a continuous random variable. Our analysis focuses
on two main issues: uniqueness versus multiplicity of equilibria and existence versus
non-existence of symmetric equilibria.
In the absence of demand uncertainty, there exists a continuum of pure-strategy equilibria
in all of which total capacity equals total demand. The symmetric candidate equilibrium
belongs to the equilibrium set since: (a) reducing capacity would further constrain production
without increasing prices and, (b) increasing capacity would not allow the deviant to expand
its production as it would just serve residual demand.
The introduction of demand uncertainty has distinct effects depending on the way de-
mand uncertainty is modelled. Under the discrete approach, the pure-strategy symmetric
equilibrium survives the introduction of uncertainty as long as none of the demand states is
sufficiently likely, and there always exist multiple pure-strategy equilibria that involve asym-
metric capacity choices. In contrast, under the continuous approach, equilibrium multiplicity
vanishes out and the symmetric equilibrium disappears.
Accordingly, by associating the continuous approach to a more uncertain environment
(in the sense that a continuum rather than a Þnite number of demand states is potentially
likely), we Þnd that uncertainty is at the heart of the uniqueness of equilibrium and the
non-existence of symmetric equilibria. Intuitively, faced with uncertainty, Þrms Þnd it more
difficult to coordinate on certain equilibria, among which we Þnd the symmetric one.
Irrespective of how demand uncertainty is modelled, a robust conclusion of the analysis
is that capacity asymmetries arise endogenously even though Þrms are ex-ante identical.
Such asymmetric market outcomes derive from asymmetries in the returns to investment
for large and small Þrms. In particular, whereas capacity expansions by the large Þrm only
affect its proÞts when the Þrm is capacity constrained, capacity expansions by the small Þrm
affect pricing incentives, and thus proÞts, even when the small Þrm is selling below capacity.
The small Þrm is discouraged from matching its rivals capacity since that would induce
more aggressive pricing from the large Þrm. Whenever these asymmetries imply that pay-off
functions are not differentiable at symmetric capacity pairs, Þrms best reply functions do
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not cross the 45 degree line, and the symmetric equilibrium disappears.
Last, the analysis allows to assess other effects of demand uncertainty, besides reducing
multiplicity or ruling out symmetric equilibria. In comparison to the certainty equivalent
game, demand uncertainty drives prices down and increases consumer surplus, despite reduc-
ing total welfare. The positive effect on prices and consumer surplus is due to the emergence
of idle capacity under demand uncertainty, which in turn explains the negative effect on
overall welfare.
The analysis of investment choice models followed by product market competition dates
back to Kreps and Scheinkmans (1983) seminal paper, which shows that price competition
and Cournot outcomes can be reconciled by assuming that Þrms choose their production
capacities prior to engaging in price competition.1 Although Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)
did not analyze the effects of introducing demand uncertainty into the model, they conjec-
tured that noise in the demand function will change this [equivalence result] dramatically
(p.337). Since then, several papers have formally analyzed this conjecture.
Similarly to us, Reynolds andWilson (2000) analyze a game of capacity choice followed by
price competition, and model demand as a random variable. Assuming a downward sloping
demand, they provide a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of a symmetric
pure-strategy equilibrium in capacity choices, but do not provide a characterization of the
equilibria for general demand functions nor demand distributions.2 Assuming linear demand
and a binomial distribution function, they characterize the symmetric (if the extent of de-
mand variation is not too large) and asymmetric pure strategy equilibria of the game. We
view our formulation as a complement to Reynolds and Wilsons (2000) in that it improves
in terms of generality and tractability at the cost of assuming inelastic demand.3
1Several papers have assessed the robustness of Kreps and Scheinkmans result to alternative model
speciÞcations, such as the rationing rule (Deneckere and Kovenock (1996); Herk (1993)), the pricing rule
(Moreno and Úbeda (2006)), the timing of capacity choices (Allen et al. (2000); Kovenock and Roy (1998)),
the existence of Þrm cost asymmetries (Deneckere and Kovenock (1996)), or the frequency of Þrms interaction
in the product market (Benoit and Krishna (1987); Davidson and Deneckere (1986); Staiger and Wolak
(1992)), among others.
2They note that a characterization of pure strategy equilibria for general demand functions and demand
shock distributions is a challenging problem (p.131) and conjecture that there may be restrictions on para-
meters or functional forms that would allow one to apply the submodular games approach (p. 132). Price
inelasticity, as in our paper, turns out to be one of those.
3The assumption of inelastic demand not only makes the analysis tractable. It also has the advantage
that the efficient-rationing rule (as in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)) and the proportional-rationing rule
(as in Davidson and Deneckere (1986)) become equivalent. Hence, the lack of robustness of Kreps and
Scheinkmans results to the choice of rationing rule does not apply in this context. Several papers that deal
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Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997) and Grimm and Zoettl (2006) also consider future demand
uncertainty at the investment stage, but assume that Þrms subsequently compete by choos-
ing quantities rather than prices. The Cournot assumption has important implications on
investment incentives and equilibrium outcomes. First, since the (unconstrained) Cournot
equilibrium is symmetric for all Þrms, capacity expansions only affect a Þrms proÞts for
those demand realizations at which the Þrm is selling at capacity. Second, since this implies
that the returns to Þrms investments are symmetric for large and small Þrms, the pay-off
functions are differentiable at symmetric capacity pairs. Last, with symmetric Þrms ex-ante
and continuous marginal returns to investment, the best reply functions are both symmet-
ric and continuous. Thus, the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in capacity choices is
guaranteed.
Our model is also related to Klemperer and Meyers (1989) seminal paper in which
Þrms facing uncertain demand compete by choosing supply functions.4 They Þnd that the
introduction of demand uncertainty dramatically shrinks the set of Nash equilibria, and
conclude that the equilibrium is unique only if the support of the demand distribution
function is unbounded. Even though our approach substantially differs from theirs,5 it is
not surprising that our conclusions concerning the effect of demand uncertainty are similar.
In both scenarios, demand uncertainty reduces the multiplicity of equilibria since it forces
each Þrms strategic decision to be optimal against a range of possible demand functions.
From a methodological point of view, our paper is also related to a broad family of
analysis which make use of submodularity to prove existence of equilibria. In this respect,
ours is similar to Amir and Wooders (2000), who consider a two stage game in which Þrms
Þrst invest in R&D activities that generate spillovers, and then compete in the product
market. They show that ex-ante identical Þrms always engage in different levels of R&D,
thus giving rise to asymmetrically sized Þrms. Applying similar techniques as Amir and
Wooders (2000), we show that if the demand distribution function is convex, our game is
submodular (i.e. the returns to investment are non-increasing in the rivals capacity choice),
allowing us to provide an additional proof of existence of the subgame perfect equilibria. The
with competition under capacity constraints have also adopted the same type of demand we use in this paper
(see for instance Compte, Jenny and Rey (2002) and Dechenaux and Kovenock (2003)).
4Grant and Quiggin (1996) endogenize capacities within the supply function approach under the as-
sumptions of Cobb-Douglas technology and constant elasticity demand. They focus only on the symmetric
equilibrium of the game, whose existence is guaranteed for similar reasons as under the Cournot assumption.
5The most important one is probably the fact that, in the supply function approach, Þrms choose a
continuum of price-quantity pairs, whereas in our set-up Þrms choose a single quantity and a single price,
and they do it in different stages.
3
feature that distinguishes our analysis and theirs is that, whereas they assume submodularity
(see assumption A2 in their paper), we are able to pin down the relevant feature of the game
(i.e., convexity of the distribution function) which is sufficient to guarantee that the proÞt
function is submodular.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model, which we solve
backwards in sections 3 (price competition) and 4 (capacity choices). In order to understand
the role played by demand uncertainty, section 4 analyzes the game in which demand is
known with certainty and then explores two approaches to modelling demand uncertainty:
the discrete and the continuous approach. Section 5 explores the effects on equilibrium
pricing and investment behavior of changing the timing of demand uncertainty. The last
section concludes with a discussion and summary of the main results. The Appendix contains
the proofs of the main results of the paper.
2 The Model
We consider a two-stage non-cooperative game between two symmetric Þrms, i = 1, 2. In
the Þrst stage of the game, Þrms simultaneously choose their capacities ki, i = 1, 2, at a
constant per-unit cost c ∈ (0, 1). We let k− = min (k1, k2) ≤ k+ = max (k1, k2) , and refer
to the Þrm with capacity k− or k+ as the small Þrm or the the large Þrm, respectively.
Once investment decisions have been made, information about capacities becomes public
knowledge. In the second stage of the game, Þrms compete in prices to sell an homogenous
good, subject to the constraint that each Þrms production cannot exceed its capacity limit.
We assume that production entails constant marginal costs, and w.l.o.g. normalize them to
zero.
There is a mass θ of inÞnitesimal buyers, each willing to buy one unit as long as the
price does not exceed the reservation price, normalized to one. Consumers buy Þrst from the
Þrm with the low price until its capacity has been exhausted. The residual demand faced
by the high-priced Þrm equals total demand minus the capacity of its rival. If Þrms prices
are equal, consumers split equally between the two Þrms.6 Each Þrm sells its production at
its own price.
Demand uncertainty is introduced between the Þrst and second stages of the game. More
speciÞcally, Þrms face uncertain demand at the investment stage, knowing that the number
6Since in our setting all consumers have the same value, rationing is not an issue, and the results are
independent of the rationing rules used. They are also independent of the tie-breaking rule.
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of consumers, θ, will be drawn (before prices are set) from a cumulative distribution function
G (θ). Finally, Þrms are assumed to be risk neutral and to maximize expected proÞts.
We proceed by backwards induction in order to Þnd the subgame perfect Nash equilibria
of the overall game. Each Þrms strategy is a pair specifying its capacity choice and, contin-
gent on realized demand θ, a distribution function over prices given both Þrms capacities.
3 Price Competition
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium in the price competition stage. Recall that
Þrms know both the realized value of demand, as well as the capacities chosen in the Þrst stage
of the game. The nature of the equilibrium is similar as in the standard capacity-constrained
price competition framework (e.g. Osborne and Pitchik (1986)), with the difference being
that we assume price-inelastic demand.
Proposition 1 For given θ and given capacities k− ≤ k+, equilibrium pricing is character-
ized as follows:
(i) (Region I) If θ ≤ k−, there exists a unique pure-strategy equilibrium in which both
Þrms set prices equal to (zero) marginal cost and make zero proÞts.
(ii) (Region II) If k− < θ < k− + k+, a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist. In the
unique mixed strategy equilibrium, the large Þrm makes expected proÞts [θ − k−], whereas the
small Þrm makes a fraction k
−
min{θ,k+} of the large Þrms proÞts.
(iii) (Region III) If θ ≥ k− + k+, both Þrms set prices equal to consumers valuation
(which equals 1), and they both sell at capacity.
Proof. See Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord (2006)s proof of Proposition 2.
Equilibrium pricing behavior depends on the relationship between demand and capacities.
For demand realizations in Region I, since both Þrms have enough capacity to serve total
demand, competition drives prices down to marginal cost, and Þrms make zero proÞts. For
demand realizations in Region III, since there is not enough aggregate capacity to cover
demand, the equilibrium price equals consumers valuation and both Þrms sell at capacity.
For the remaining demand realizations, pure-strategy equilibria fail to exist given that either
(i) Þrms want to price slightly below the rival to sell at capacity at a high price or (ii) want
to serve the residual demand at consumers reservation price. For a given demand realization
in Region II, there exists a unique mixed strategy equilibrium such that the two Þrms mix
over a common support, with a lower bound strictly above zero and an upper bound equal
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to consumers reservation price. Since the large Þrm plays a mass point at the upper bound,
and since the small Þrm is pricing below that level with probability one, the large Þrms
expected proÞts are the same as if it maximized its proÞts over its residual demand.
To sum up, the Þrst stage capacity choices, together with realized demand, will determine
whether competition in the second stage of the game will be à la Bertrand (with Þrms pricing
at marginal cost in Region I), à la Bertrand-Edgeworth (with Þrms mixing in Region II) or
à la Cournot (with Þrms producing at capacity in Region III).7
4 Capacity Choices
In this section we endogenize capacities. As a benchmark, we Þrst consider the case in which
demand is known with certainty, and then proceed to introducing demand uncertainty into
the model.
4.1 Demand Certainty
We Þrst assume that demand is known at the investment stage. The following Proposition
characterizes equilibrium capacity choices.
Proposition 2 Assume that demand is known to be equal to θ. There is a continuum of pure-
strategy subgame perfect equilibria. SpeciÞcally, every proÞle of Þrms capacities with k+ ∈¡
θ
2
, θ
2−c
¤
and k− = θ − k+ can be sustained by a pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium.
Hence, there are asymmetric equilibria as well as a symmetric one. Furthermore, in every
pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium aggregate capacity equals θ.
Proof. It is a particular case of the proof of Proposition 3 below.
Under demand certainty, there exists a continuum of pure-strategy equilibria, in all of
which aggregate capacity is equal to total demand, as illustrated by Figure 1. Hence, in
any equilibrium capacity is fully utilized and prices are set equal to consumers reservation
value. The only restriction imposed on the set of equilibria is that the large Þrm need not be
too large, since otherwise the small Þrm would be better off increasing its capacity even at
the expense of driving prices below the reservation price. Since the symmetric capacity pair
satisÞes this condition, it constitutes an equilibrium. Intuitively, the symmetric equilibrium
7As shown by Dechenaux and Kovenock (2003), the equilibria in the pricing game induce equivalent
outcomes as those that would arise if we allowed Þrms to costlessly choose the maximum quantity that each
is willing to sell at the quoted price, subject to their capacity limits.
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Figure 1: Firms Reaction Functions at the Investment Stage: certain demand
is sustained by two forces: (a) a Þrm is discouraged from reducing its capacity since this would
constrain its production without increasing prices (already set at the reservation level); and
(b) a Þrm is also discouraged from increasing its capacity since, while it is costly, it would
not lead to an increase in its production (the deviant would become the large Þrm, so it
would be selling the residual demand without exhausting its capacity).
4.2 Discrete Demand Uncertainty
Let us now assume that demand is uncertain at the investment stage. We Þrst model demand
uncertainty as deriving from a binomial distribution function.
Proposition 3 Suppose that demand takes the value θL > 0 with probability ρ ∈ [0, 1] and
θH with probability 1− ρ. Let ∆ = θH
θL
≥ 1. There exists ρ ∈ ¡1−c
2
, 1− c¢ such that:
(i) Symmetric equilibria in capacity choices exist if and only if ρ ∈ [0, ρ)∪ (1− c, 1] . For
all ρ, there exists a continuum of asymmetric equilibria in capacity choices.
(ii) In any pure-strategy equilibrium, aggregate capacity is θL if ρ ∈ (1− c, 1] , and is θH
otherwise.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Similarly to the certain demand case, the investment game under discrete demand un-
certainty generates a continuum of pure-strategy equilibria. These equilibria induce two
distinct types of outcomes.
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On the one hand, if the probability of the low demand state is sufficiently large (i.e.,
ρ ∈ (1− c, 1]), Þrms behave as if demand was known to be low with certainty. In particular,
equilibrium aggregate capacity equals low demand, capacity is fully utilized, and prices are
equal to consumers reservation value independently of which demand state is Þnally realized.
Furthermore, for all values of ρ in this range, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in capacity
choices. This is so for similar reasons as under demand certainty: (a) capacity reductions
would further constrain production without increasing prices, and (b) capacity expansions
would not allow the deviant to increase its production in the low demand state (since it
would just serve the residual demand), and the marginal gain associated with the increase
in production in the high demand state, 1− ρ, would not cover the extra investment costs,
c.
On the other hand, if the probability of the low demand state is sufficiently small (i.e.,
ρ ∈ (0, 1− c]), Þrms behave in a similar fashion as when demand is high with certainty. Since
aggregate equilibrium capacity is equal to high demand, capacity is fully utilized and prices
are at its maximum only when demand turns out to be high. Otherwise, if realized demand
is low, there is excess capacity and prices are below their reservation level. This fact implies
that a symmetric equilibrium may not exist for some ρ values over this range. In particular,
point (a) above may no longer hold: since for low demand Þrms operate below capacity, a
capacity reduction would not constrain the deviants production but it would lead to higher
prices. Clearly, the associated marginal gain has to be balanced against the marginal loss
that the deviant suffers from having to reduce its production under high demand, and this
ultimately depends on the relative incidence of low and high demand. When low demand is
sufficiently probable (i.e. ρ ∈ £ρ, 1− c¤), the marginal gain from reducing capacity exceeds
its marginal cost, and therefore destroys the candidate symmetric equilibrium. Comparative
statics of the asymmetric equilibria show that they approach the symmetric equilibrium as
ρ approaches ρ.
Comparison with the certain demand case allows to derive interesting conclusions re-
garding the role of demand uncertainty as an equilibrium selection device. If we perturb
the certain demand case by introducing demand uncertainty, we obtain distinct conclusions
depending on whether we decrease ρ below 1 or raise it above 0. In the Þrst case, demand
uncertainty reduces the multiplicity of equilibria, whereas in the second case, it widens it.8
The intuition runs as follows. When we decrease ρ below 1, we are adding a state with higher
8This is true independently of whether we move ρ alone, or on whether we keep expected demand constant
by either reducing θL as we decrease ρ, or by increasing θH as we increase ρ.
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demand. Since the small Þrm would then like to increase her capacity in order to produce
more when demand is high, she has to be given a bigger share of aggregate capacity (Þxed
at θL). This shrinks the equilibrium set. In the opposite case, when we increase ρ above 0,
we are adding a state with lower demand. Now, since the problem is to discourage the large
Þrm from reducing her capacity, the large Þrm has to be compensated with a bigger share
of aggregate capacity (Þxed at θH). This expands the equilibrium set.
Last, note that independently of the value of ρ, equilibrium capacity choices are never
unique, and that, as long as the change in ρ with respect to the certain demand case is not
large enough, the symmetric equilibrium survives the introduction of uncertainty.
However, as we will show in the following section, these two issues - uniqueness versus
multiplicity of equilibria and existence versus non-existence of symmetric equilibria -
depend not only on the amount of uncertainty (however measured) but also on the way
demand uncertainty is modelled. In particular, taking a discrete or a continuous approach
to modelling demand uncertainty is not innocuous. In contrast to the discrete approach
analyzed so far, the continuous approach shows that the multiplicity of equilibria disappears,
and the symmetric equilibrium disappears with it, as we spread probability over a compact
set of demand values.
4.3 Continuous Demand Uncertainty
To conclude this section, we assume that demand is distributed according to a continuous
distribution function, G (θ) , with full support on [0, 1]. Based on Proposition 1, we can con-
struct Þrms expected proÞt function at the investment stage as a function of their capacity
choices,
πi (ki, kj) =
 π− (k−, k+) if ki ≤ kjπ+ (k+, k−) if ki ≥ kj (1)
where,9
π−
¡
k−, k+
¢
=
k−+k+Z
k−
k−
min {θ, k+}
£
θ − k−¤ dG (θ) + 1Z
k−+k+
k−dG(θ)− ck− (2)
π+
¡
k+, k−
¢
=
k−+k+Z
k−
£
θ − k−¤ dG (θ) + 1Z
k−+k+
k+dG (θ)− ck+ (3)
9Note that we are implicitly assuming that k− + k+ ≤ 1. It can easily be shown that k− + k+ > 1
would never constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium. The reason is that the large Þrm would never sell at
capacity, so that it would be better off by reducing its capacity to the point at which aggregate capacity no
longer exceeds the maximum demand realization.
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Capacity choices affect the value of Þrms proÞts for a given demand realization.10 For
demand realizations in Region I (i.e., below k−), proÞts are zero independently of the value of
Þrms capacities, whereas for demand realizations in Region III (i.e., above k− + k+), Þrms
proÞts are fully determined by their capacity choices. The link between capacity choices
and proÞts becomes more complex for demand realizations in Region II (i.e., in the interval
(k−, k−+k+)). Over this range, the large Þrms proÞts do not depend on its own capacity, as
these are the same as if it served the residual demand with probability one. In contrast, the
small Þrms proÞts depend on its own capacity choice, for two reasons: Þrst, it constrains
its sales when it prices below the rival; and second, it affects its rivals pricing behavior,
ultimately determining its chances of selling at capacity.
The expected proÞt function πi (ki, kj) is everywhere continuous in ki. Nevertheless, it is
not differentiable at symmetric capacity pairs. In particular, along the diagonal, the right-
hand derivative is larger than the left-hand derivative. This non-differentiability stems from
the asymmetric effects of marginal increases in capacities across Þrms in Region II: whereas
the large Þrm gains nothing by expanding its capacity, an increase in the small Þrms capacity
may lead to either a proÞt gain or a proÞt loss depending on the strength of the two effects
involved: an increase in its capacity allows it to expand its production when it prices below
the rival; however, as this also makes the large Þrm more aggressive,11 the probability that
this occurs is reduced.
The next lemma summarizes some properties of the expected proÞt function, (1).
Lemma 1 Suppose that demand is distributed according to a continuous distribution func-
tion G (θ) with full support on [0, 1] .
(i) The following are sufficient conditions for the expected proÞt function to be piece-wise
concave: either G (θ) is convex, or G (θ) is concave and G0 (θ) is convex.
(ii) The second-order cross derivative of the large Þrm is negative for all G (θ) .
(iii) The following are sufficient conditions for the second-order cross derivative of the
small Þrm to be negative: either if G (θ) is convex, or G (θ) is concave and k+ > 2k−.
Proof. See the Appendix.
10Capacity choices also affect the distribution of equilibrium proÞts. However, the effect of marginal
increases in capacity on proÞts is null since the proÞt function in continuous in θ.
11In more detail, the large Þrm plays a mass point at the reservation price with probability 1− k−min(θ,k+) .
Hence, the higher k−, the less likely it is that the large Þrm prices at the upper bound of the support of
Þrms mixed strategies.
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The Þrst part of the Lemma guarantees that under certain weak conditions on the shape
of the demand distribution function,12 the problem is well-behaved in the sense that both
the large and the small Þrms expected proÞt functions are concave. The second part allows
to conclude that investments are strategic substitutes for the large Þrm, whereas the third
part identiÞes the properties of the demand distribution function that make this also true
for the small Þrm. The intuition for these results runs as follows.
An increase in the large Þrms capacity allows to expand its production for demand re-
alizations in Region III (i.e. when demand exceeds aggregate capacity). Since the relative
incidence of demand realizations in Region III is lower the bigger the small Þrm, the large
Þrms marginal returns to investment are decreasing in the small Þrms capacity. Hence,
conditionally on being the large Þrm, capacity investments are strategic substitutes irrespec-
tively of how demand is distributed.
Similarly, an increase in the small Þrms capacity allows to expand its production in
Region III. This effect alone would imply that the small Þrms proÞts exhibit decreasing
marginal returns to investment as the large Þrms capacity is increased. However, since an
increase in the small Þrms capacity also affects pricing behavior for demand realizations in
Region II (i.e. above the small Þrms capacity but below aggregate capacity), it has two
additional effects. On the one hand, as the small Þrm expands its capacity, it increases
the probability of being undercut, and the loss in production (i.e., from selling at capacity
to serving the residual demand) is greater the bigger the large Þrm. On the other hand,
the probability that the small Þrm sells at capacity, and therefore beneÞts from capacity
expansions, is increasing in the large Þrms capacity, given that the large Þrm prices less ag-
gressively the bigger its own capacity. Hence, the small Þrms marginal returns to investment
may increase or decrease depending on the strength of these three effects, an issue which in
turn depends on the shape of the demand distribution function as well as on Þrms relative
sizes. With convex distribution functions, which put more weight on larger demand values,
the Þrst two effects dominate, so that capacity investments are strategic substitutes from the
small Þrms perspective. This is also true with concave distribution functions as long as Þrms
are sufficiently asymmetric. Otherwise, investments may become strategic complements for
the small Þrm.
These properties have implications for the shape of Þrms reaction functions. When
the demand distribution is convex, both the large and the small Þrms best reply functions
12These properties are satisÞed by a large family of distribution functions. For instance, to name just a
few, G (θ) = θx, or G (θ) = 1−e
−xθ
1−e−x , independently of the value of x.
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are continuous decreasing functions except at one point. Furthermore, around the point of
discontinuity, expected proÞts exhibit non-increasing differences in capacities. Hence, since
marginal returns to increasing capacities do not increase with the rivals choice, we can apply
the theory of submodular games to the capacity investment game in order to ensure existence
of equilibria (Topkins 1979).
Proposition 4 If demand is distributed according to a convex cdf with full support on [0, 1] ,
the capacity game is submodular, and hence has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In contrast, if the demand distribution is concave, the large Þrms reaction function is
negatively sloped, but the slope of the small Þrms reaction function may become positively
sloped for some capacity values. Since this implies that the small Þrms marginal returns
to expanding capacity may increase with the rivals choice, we cannot apply submodularity
to ensure existence of pure strategy equilibria. Nevertheless, independently of the shape of
the demand distribution function, we can guarantee existence of pure-strategy equilibria, as
stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose that demand is distributed according to a cdf, G (θ) , with full sup-
port on [0, 1] . The following statements hold for the capacity game:
(i) Every pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in capacity choices is asymmetric.13
(ii) If the second order condition (6) is satisÞed, then it holds that: a) best reply functions
are continuous everywhere except at one point, k ∈ (0, 1) , where R+i (k) > k > R−i (k), and b)
there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome that involves asymmetric capacity
choices. SpeciÞcally, in equilibrium one Þrm invests k+ and the other invests k−, with
k+ > k−, and k− + k+ = G−1 (1− c) ⊂ (0, 1) .
Proof. See the Appendix.
The proof of Proposition 5 relies on the analysis of Þrms best reaction functions. In-
dependently of the shape of the demand distribution function, the best reaction functions,
13There also exists a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, in which Þrms randomly choose capacities.
The lower bound in the support of Þrms strategies is given by the pure-strategy capacity choice of the small
Þrm, whereas the upper bound is strictly below the pure-strategy capacity choice of the large Þrm. Note that
even if the equilibrium is symmetric, Þrms would still end up asymmetric with positive probability, despite
being fully symmetric ex-ante. The symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium is Pareto dominated by any of
the two pure-strategy asymmetric equilibria from the point of view of Þrms proÞts.
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Figure 2: Firms Reaction Functions at the Investment Stage: continuous uncertainty
which are discontinuous at k, never cross the 45 degree line given that the marginal returns
to investment are asymmetric along the diagonal. This rules out the existence of symmetric
equilibria in capacity choices and implies that every pure-strategy equilibrium has to involve
asymmetric capacity choices. Indeed, since Þrms reaction functions cross twice outside the
discontinuity region, k− < k < k+, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium out-
come in which the large Þrm invests k+ and the small Þrm invests k−.14 Intuitively, the
asymmetric endogenous market structure is sustained by the fact that the small Þrm is dis-
couraged from becoming larger since, if demand falls in Region II, it would make the large
Þrm price more aggressively, thereby reducing its chances of selling at capacity. Figure 2
illustrates Þrms reaction functions under continuous demand uncertainty.
Proposition 5 above further shows that, independently of which equilibrium is played,
aggregate capacity equals G−1(1 − c). Hence, aggregate investment crucially depends on
investment costs, as well as on the shape of the distribution of demand uncertainty. In
particular, as the degree of convexity of G increases, aggregate equilibrium capacity, k− +
k+, goes up. Firms react by expanding aggregate capacity as the degree of convexity in
the distribution function goes up since it implies that larger (smaller) demand realizations
become more (less) likely.
We conclude this section by comparing equilibrium outcomes in the game with continuous
14Strictly speaking, there exist exactly two asymmetric equilibria, (k−, k+) and (k+, k−) , which only differ
in the identity of the large and the small Þrm. Therefore, these two equilibria are outcome equivalent.
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demand uncertainty with those that arise in the certainty equivalent game, i.e. the game
in which demand is known to be equal to expected demand in the uncertain game, E [θ] =R 1
0
θdG (θ) .
Proposition 6 Comparison of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes in the game with con-
tinuous demand uncertainty versus its certainty equivalent shows that,
(i) Aggregate capacity is larger under demand uncertainty if and only if c ∈ (0,bc), wherebc is implicitly deÞned by G−1 (1− bc) = E [θ] .
(ii) Prices are lower and consumer surplus is higher under demand uncertainty.
(iii) Total welfare is lower under demand uncertainty.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Under demand uncertainty, a marginal increase in the large Þrms capacity allows it to
sell more output at the reservation price whenever demand exceeds aggregate capacity, but
it implies an additional investment cost, c. Hence, an increase in c reduces investment, and
may ultimately lead to very low investment levels as c approaches consumers reservation
price. In contrast, under demand certainty, Þrms invest just enough so as to cover demand
irrespectively of the unit cost of capacity (as long as it does not exceed consumers reserva-
tion value). Therefore, demand uncertainty generates more investment as compared to the
certainty equivalent game if and only if c is sufficiently low with respect to expected demand.
Furthermore, under demand uncertainty, the emergence of idle capacity for some demand
realizations drives prices below the reservation price, allowing consumers to retain a positive
share of total surplus. However, the emergence of unused capacity also implies that total
welfare is reduced since Þrms could have saved on investment costs ex-post. This contrasts
with the certainty equivalent game, which provides more efficient outcomes at the cost of
driving consumer surplus to zero.
5 Prices are set before demand uncertainty is resolved
In this section we explore a variation on the main model. In particular, we change the timing
of demand uncertainty and assume that demand is realized after (rather than before) prices
are set. This formulation has three alternative interpretations which yield mathematical
equivalent results. First, demand could simply be uncertain at the pricing stage. Alterna-
tively, demand could be known but it is not possible to change prices as frequently as demand
conditions vary (for instance, due to the existence of menu costs, seasonal brochures, etc.).
Last, there could exist a fringe of price-taking Þrms whose supply is stochastic; hence, even
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if total demand is Þxed and known with certainty, the residual demand faced by the strategic
players is uncertain at the pricing stage.
Since demand is random at the pricing stage, we need to provide a new characterization
of the equilibrium. Consider Þrst the pricing stage. Trivially, if the small Þrm chooses to be
large enough so that its capacity always exceeds the largest possible demand realization, Þrms
would always set prices equal to marginal costs. However, and precisely for this reason, this
case would never arise as a subgame perfect equilibrium. If the small Þrm is always capacity
constrained to serve the market alone, the equilibrium differs substantially from the case
in which demand is known with certainty before prices are set. In particular, two forces
destroy any candidate pure-strategy equilibrium: on the one hand, a higher price translates
into higher proÞts if demand exceeds aggregate capacity; on the other hand, pricing high
reduces a Þrms expected sales. Hence, one needs to consider equilibria in mixed strategies
(see Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord, 2006).
We Þnd that the large Þrms expected proÞts do not depend on whether demand is
realized before or after prices are set. The small Þrms proÞts do however depend on the
timing of demand uncertainty, but they still preserve the main feature that accounts for
the non-existence of a symmetric equilibrium in capacity choices under continuous demand
uncertainty. Namely, around a symmetric capacity pair, the small Þrms marginal returns
to investment are lower than those of the large Þrm, since the small Þrm takes into account
that an increase in its capacity would induce a more aggressive pricing behavior by its rival.
Since a full characterization of equilibrium capacity choices when demand is realized
after prices are set is out of the scope of the paper, we limit ourselves here to providing the
equilibrium characterization under the assumption of uniformly distributed demand.
Lemma 2 Assume that demand is uniformly distributed on the unit interval and that it is
realized after prices are set. Then, there exist a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
in which one Þrm invests k+ and the other invests k+, with k+ > k− and k− + k+ = 1− c.
SpeciÞcally,
k+ =
1
2
h√
3c2 + 4c+ 2− 3c
i
and k− = [1− c]− k+.
Proof. See the Appendix.
A straightforward comparison of equilibrium outcomes when prices are set either before
or after uncertainty is resolved shows that, under the assumption of uniformly distributed
demand, aggregate capacity is the same, but prices and proÞts are higher when Þrms compete
in prices without knowing demand.
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6 Conclusions
We have analyzed a game in which Þrms take investment decisions under demand uncertainty,
and then compete in prices subject to capacity constraints. In order to understand the role
played by demand uncertainty, we have Þrst characterized equilibrium capacity choices under
demand certainty. Demand certainty guarantees the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in
capacity choices at which each Þrm invests just enough so as to serve one half of the market.
Nevertheless, there also exist a continuum of asymmetric equilibria in all of which Þrms
capacities sum up to total market demand.
In contrast, the introduction of demand uncertainty has important implications on equi-
librium investment choices, as it may rule out the existence of symmetric equilibria and
reduce the multiplicity of equilibria. Intuitively, demand uncertainty strengthens Þrms in-
centives to deviate from a candidate equilibrium, as it gives rise to demand states at which
Þrms aggregate capacity does not coincide with market demand. If there is excess capacity,
Þrms may have unilateral incentives to cut down on investments, whereas is there is excess
demand, Þrms may have gains from expanding investments. However, while deviating by
expanding (contracting) capacity may increase a Þrms proÞt whenever there is excess de-
mand (supply), it also depresses proÞts in all remaining states. Therefore, for deviations
to be proÞtable, they have to be Þned tuned so that the marginal losses do not offset the
marginal gains from deviating. Since discreteness in the grid of demand states may stop a
large number of deviations from being proÞtable, the discrete approach to modelling demand
uncertainty delivers multiple equilibria. This contrasts with the continuous approach, which
predicts a unique equilibrium outcome.
A robust conclusion of the analysis is that the investment incentives induced by price
competition give rise to asymmetric marginal returns to investment, which ultimately lead
to asymmetric equilibria in capacity choices. Unlike the large Þrms capacity, changes in
the small Þrms capacity have crucial effects on Þrms pricing incentives. In particular, a
marginal increase in the small Þrms capacity would induce more aggressive pricing by the
large Þrm, thereby reducing the small Þrms chances of selling at capacity. This result does
not depend on how demand uncertainty is modelled and it is also robust to changing the
timing of demand uncertainty.
Our formulation contributes to the existing literature on capacity choices and imperfect
competition under demand uncertainty in several respects. First, in contrast to the papers
that assume Cournot competition, our approach conforms the widely accepted view that
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Þrms compete in prices subject to capacity constraints. Second, as compared to the papers
that analyze investment decisions followed by Bertrand competition, our approach is appeal-
ing in terms of generality and tractability, as it provides a characterization of pure-strategy
equilibria for general demand distributions and allows to make use of powerful results within
the theory of submodular games. Last, our model is able to generate relevant predictions
regarding market structure and the sensitivity of investment decisions and pricing behavior
to measurable variables, such as the shape of the demand distribution function, or to market
characteristics, such as the timing of demand uncertainty.
Our analysis may shed light on investment incentives and endogenous market structure
in a large set of industries characterized by long-lived assets that involve large sunk cost
investments, imperfect competition and demand ßuctuations. These features are common
to most important industries producing commodities, such as steel, chemicals, cement, or
electricity, to name just a few. The main implication of this analysis for the empirical work
is that the distribution of past or future demand could be used as an additional determinant
of the long-run market structure, and thus market power, in this type of industries.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3 Let k2 = y and consider the best reply by Þrm one to its rival
capacity choices. If y ≤ min(θL, θH
2
) then Þrm one expected proÞt is a continuous piecewise
function with two regions. In particular,
π(k, y) =
 ρmin
n
k
y
¡
θL − k¢ , ko+ ([1− ρ] k − ck 0 ≤ k ≤ y
ρ
£
θL − y¤+ ([1− ρ] min(©θH − y, kª− ck y ≤ k ≤ θH
Assume Þrst ρ ≤ ρ < [1− c] so that the high demand realization is most likely. In region 2
proÞts are strictly decreasing for any k > θH − y, whereas for k < θH − y proÞts are strictly
increasing as ρ < 1− c. Thus local maximum is θH−y. In region 1, proÞts are maximized at
k∗(y) = 1
2
h
θL + y 1−c−ρ
ρ
i
· Since k∗(y) > y for any ρ ≤ 1−c
2
, the global maximum and hence
the best reply is θH − y. If ρ ∈ ¡1−c
2
, 1− c¢ there is y ∈ ³θL
2
, θL
´
, y = ρ θ
L
3ρ−1+c , such that
k∗ (y) = y. Thus, for all y ≤ y the local maxima is y, and the global maximum is θH − y.
In contrast, for y ≥ y the local maxima is k∗. To determine the global maxima we need
to compare proÞts at local maxima in (1) and (2). The difference in proÞts, π(θH − y, y)−
π(k∗(y), y), is a concave function with a maximum below θ
L
2
,15 so that over the relevant
range y ≤ min
n
θL, θ
H
2
o
it is strictly decreasing in y. We need to distinguish two cases: 1).
min
n
θL, θ
H
2
o
= θL, i.e., ∆ > 2. In this case the difference in proÞts evaluated at y = θL
attains a value of zero iff ρ = ρ0, so that the global maximum is θH − y for all ρ ≤ ρ0, where
ρ0 =
1− c
2
"
1 +
r
∆− 2
∆− 1
#
.
15Note that
∂
h
Dπ = π(θH − y, y)− π(k∗(y), y)
i
∂y
=
h
ρθL
i2
− y2 ([1− c+ ρ])2 , with ∂
2 [Dπ]
∂y∂ρ
> 0.
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As Þrm two increases further her capacity so that θL ≤ y ≤ θH
2
, the maximum in region 1
becomes 1−c
2ρ
θL· The global maximum remains θH − y if ρ ≤ ρ < ρ0, where
ρ (∆) =
1− c
2
"
1 +
r
∆− 2
∆
#
∈
µ
1− c
2
, 1− c
¶
with ρ (2) =
1− c
2
As θ
H
2
belongs to the best reply, a symmetric equilibria exists for any ρ ≤ ρ. Furthermore,
as θH − y remains the global maximum for any y ≤ y∗ = θH − θL[1−c]2
4ρ[1−ρ−c] with y
∗ ≥ θH
2
,
there is also a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. In particular, if ρ ≤ 1−c
2
equilibria are
pairs (θH − k+, k+) with k+ ∈
h
θH
2
, θH − y0(ρ)
i
. If ρ ∈ ¡1−c
2
, ρ
¤
there are two disjoint sets
of equilibria, one made of pairs (θH − k+, k+) with k+ ∈
h
θH − 1−c
2ρ
θL, y0(ρ)
i
, and the other
one consisting of pairs (θH − k+, k+) with k+ ∈
h
θH
2
, θH − θL(1−c)2
4ρ(1−ρ−c)
i
. Note that as ρ→ 1−c
2
we have limρ→ 1−c
2
h
θH −
³
θH − θL(1−c)2
4ρ(1−ρ−c)
´
− 1−c
2ρ
θL
i
= 0 so that the two sets of equilibria
become connected and hence we get as equilibria exactly those as when ρ ≤ 1−c
2
. Consider
now case 2). min
n
θL, θ
H
2
o
= θ
H
2
so that ∆ ≤ 2. The difference in proÞts evaluated at y = θH
2
is zero iff ρ = ρ where
ρ (∆) = (1− c)
µ
∆
3∆− 2
¶
∈
µ
1− c
2
, 1− c
¶
with ρ (2) =
1− c
2
Thus for any ρ ≤ ρ the global maximum is θH−y, which ensures the existence of a symmetric
equilibrium at θ
H
2
. As Þrm two increases its capacity up to θL the global maximum remains
θH − y for any y ≤ (1+ρ)θH−ρθL
2−c , which ensures the existence of a continuum of asymmetric
equilibria. Letting ρ be equal to ρ for ∆ > 2 and equal to ρ for ∆ ≤ 2, we have part i) of
proposition follows.
Let now ρ > 1−c so that the low demand realization is most likely. In region 2 proÞts are
strictly decreasing for any k as ρ > 1− c. Thus local maximum is y. In region 1, proÞts are
maximized at k∗(y) if it is larger than θL− y and at θL− y otherwise. Since k∗(y) < θL− y
for any y ≤ θL ρ
1+ρ−c , the best reply is θ
L − y for 0 ≤ y ≤ θL ρ
1+ρ−c and it is k
∗(y) for
y ∈
h
θL ρ
1+ρ−c , θ
L
i
. As θL ρ
1+ρ−c >
θL
2
, a symmetric equilibrium always exist together with a
continuum of asymmetric equilibria (θL − k+, k+) with k+ ∈
³
θL
2
, θ
Lρ
1+ρ−c
i
, which shows ii).
Consider Þnally ρ ∈ ¡ρ, 1− c¢ . Local maximum in region 2 is θH − y as ρ < 1 − c. In
region 1, proÞts are maximized at k∗(y) which is now larger than θL − y for any y > θL
2
·
Furthermore, there is y ∈
³
θL
2
, θL
´
, y = ρ θ
L
3ρ−1+c , such that k
∗ (y) = y. Thus, for all 0 < y ≤ y
the local maxima is y, and the global maximum is θH − y. To determine the global maxima
when y > y we must again distinguish two cases.
1). Let∆ > 2. For ρ ∈ (ρ, ρ0) the global maximum is θH−y for all y ∈ £y, θL¤ as shown above.
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As Þrm two increases further its capacity so that θL ≤ y ≤ θH
2
, the maximum in region 1
becomes [1−c]
2ρ
θL· Comparing proÞts at the two local maxima, it is straightforward to see that
the global maximum is θH − y for any y ≤ θH − θL(1−c)2
4ρ(1−ρ−c) whereas it is
(1−c)
2ρ
θL otherwise.
Since θH − θL(1−c)2
4ρ(1−ρ−c) <
θH
2
the best reply does not cross the 45o line so that a symmetric
equilibrium fails to exists.16 However there is a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. To
show this claim we need to characterize the best reply for y > θ
H
2
· We Þrst note that the
proÞt function of Þrm 1 when θ ≥ y ≥ max
n
θL, θ
H
2
o
is a piecewise concave function with
three regions given by
π(k, y) =

ρ k
θL
¡
θL − k¢+ (1− ρ) k − ck 0 ≤ k < θH − y
ρmin
©
k
θL
£
θL − k¤ , 0ª+ ((1− ρ) k
y
¡
θH − k¢− ck θH − y ≤ k ≤ y
(1− ρ) ¡θH − y¢− ck y ≤ k ≤ θL.
For capacities in region (1) local maximum is 1−c
2ρ
θL which equals θH−y at y = θH− 1−c
2ρ
θL. For
capacities in (2) the local maximum is k(y) = θ
L
2
³
θH(1−ρ)+(ρ−c)y
θL(1−ρ)+yρ
´
which is decreasing in y.17
Since k(y)−¡θH − y¢ is increasing in y, and k(θH−θL)−θL = θL
2
³
θH(1−c−2ρ)−θL(2−c−3ρ)
θL(1−2ρ)+θHρ
´
< 0
whereas k(θH) = θ
L
2
(1−c)θH
θL(1−ρ)+θHρ > 0, there is y
0(ρ) such that the local maximum is
£
θH − y¤
if y ≤ y0 and it is k(y) otherwise. Moreover,
y0(ρ) =
2ρθH − θL (2− ρ− c) +
q¡
(2− c− ρ) θL¢2 + 4ρθH ¡ρ ¡θH − θL¢¢+ cθL
4ρ
·
Consequently, for any ρ ∈ ¡1−c
2
, 1
¤
, global maximum is 1−c
2ρ
θL if y ≤ θH− 1−c
2ρ
θL, it is
£
θH − y¤
for θH − 1−c
2ρ
θL < y < y0(ρ) and it is k(y) for y > y0(ρ). Discussion above shows that if Þrm 1
is the large Þrm, it is an equilibrium to play
¡
k+, θH − k+¢ for any k+ ∈ hθH − 1−c
2ρ
θL, y0(ρ)
i
.
2). Assume now ∆ < 2. The best reply is a continuous function everywhere except at
one point, y = y¯ ∈
³
θL
2
, θ
H
2
´
. Recall that for ρ ∈ [ρ, 1− c) there is y¯(ρ) ∈
³
y, θ
H
2
´
such that
the global maximum is θH − y if y ≤ y ≤ y¯ and it is k∗ for y¯ ≤ y ≤ θH
2
, where denoting by
r to 1− c− ρ, we have
y¯(ρ) = ρ
r
¡
2θH − θL¢+ 2ρθL + 2qr ¡θH − θL¢ ¡θHr − (r − ρ) θL¢
(1− c+ ρ)2
Since it never crosses the 45o line, a symmetric equilibrium fails to exists. Nevertheless there
is a continuum of asymmetric equilibria each of them involving total capacity equal to θH .
16The same is true for ρ > ρ0 but now the best reply jumps down at a smaller y. In particular the best
reply becomes θH − y for 0 ≤ y ≤ y¯ and k∗(y) for y¯ ≤ y ≤ θL.
17Note that kˆ(y) < θL as kˆ(y) < kˆ
³
θH
2
´
< θL for all ρ > ∆(2−c)−43∆−4 · Since ρˆ > ∆(2−c)−43∆−4 the statement
follows.
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The set of asymmetric equilibria depends on the value of ∆. In particular if 1 < ∆ < 5−3c
3−c
then it is an equilibrium to play
¡
k+, θH − k+¢ for any k+ ∈ ·ρ2θH−θL
1−c+ρ ,
ρ(θH−θL)+θH
2−c
¸
; if
5−3c
3−c ≤ ∆ ≤ 3/2 it is an equilibrium to play any k+ ∈
h
ρ2θ
H−θL
1−c+ρ ,max(θ
L, y0(ρ))
i
, and if
∆ > 3/2, the asymmetric equilibria are given by k+ ∈
h
ρ2θ
H−θL
1−c+ρ , y
0(ρ)
i
if ρ ∈ ¡ρ, 1−c
2
1
∆−1
¢
,
and by k+ ∈
h
θH − 1−c
2ρ
θL, y0(ρ)
i
if ρ ∈ ¡1−c
2
1
∆−1 , 1− c
¢
. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1
The Þrst order derivatives of (2) and (3) are given by,
∂π−
∂k−
=
k−+k+Z
k−
θ − 2k−
min {θ, k+}dG (θ) + 1−G
¡
k− + k+
¢− c (4)
∂π+
∂k+
= 1−G ¡k− + k+¢− c (5)
(i) The second order derivatives of (2) and (3) are given by,
∂2π−
∂ [k−]2
= −
"
2
Z k−+k+
k−
dG(θ)
min {θ, k+} +G
0 ¡k− + k+¢ k−
k+
−G0 ¡k−¢# (6)
∂2π+
∂ [k+]2
= −G0 ¡k− + k+¢ < 0 for all cdf G.
The second-order derivative of the small Þrm is negative for any convex cdf. Note that if G
is convex then
R k−+k+
k+
dG(θ) > G0 (k−) which suffices for (6) to be negative. If G is concave
but its pdf G0 is convex then the result does also hold. To see this note that a sufficient
condition for the SOC to be negative is
2
Z k−+k+
k−
dG(θ)
k+
+G0
¡
k− + k+
¢ k−
k+
−G0 ¡k−¢ > 0.
In what follows we show that this inequality holds for a convex pdf. To do so we use an
auxiliary result whose statement and proof follows. If G0 is convex then
2
Z k−+k+
k−
dG(θ)
k+
−G0 ¡k−¢ ≥ G0 ¡k−¢+ £k+ − k−¤G00 ¡k−¢ . (7)
Let g be a convex function. Since a convex function is locally Lipschitzian, integration by
parts implies Z b
x
[b− t] g0(t)dt−
Z x
a
[t− a] g0(t)dt =
Z b
a
g(t)dt− [b− a] g(x)
Since g0(t) ≥ g0+(x) for all t ∈ [x, b], if we multiply by [b− t] ≥ 0, t ∈ [x, b] and we integrate
on [x, b] we get, Z b
x
[b− t] g0(t)dt ≥ 1
2
[b− x]2 g0+(x). (8)
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Similarly, since g0(t) ≤ g0−(x) for all t ∈ [a, x], multiplying both sides by [t− a] ≥ 0, t ∈ [a, x]
and integrating on [a, x] we get,Z x
a
[t− a] g0(t)dt ≤ 1
2
[x− a]2 g0−(x). (9)
Extracting (9) from (8), we deduceZ b
a
g(t)dt− [b− a] g(x) ≥ 1
2
£
[b− x]2 g0+(x)− [x− a]2 g0−(x)
¤
If x is a point of differentiability for g, then g0+(x) = g
0
−(x) = g
0(x) and the inequality above
simpliÞes to
1
b− a
Z b
a
g(t)dt− g(x) ≥
·
a+ b
2
− x
¸
g0(x)
Taking a = k−, b = k− + k+, x = k−, and g = G0, we haveZ k−+k+
k−
dG(θ)
k+
−G0 ¡k−¢ ≥ ·k+ − k−
2
¸
G00
¡
k−
¢
andZ k−+k+
k−
dG(θ)
k+
≥ G0 ¡k−¢+ ·k+ − k−
2
¸
G00
¡
k−
¢
Adding up the two inequalities above, the result (7) is derived. Using the derived inequality,
the SOC is negative if
G0
¡
k−
¢
+
£
k+ − k−¤G00 ¡k−¢+G0 ¡k− + k+¢ k−
k+
> 0,
which holds trivially as G0 (k−)+ [k+ − k−]G00 (k−) is the linear approximation (the tangent
line y(x) = G0 (k−)+(x−k−)G00(k−)) to G00 at argument k− passing by x = k+, and it hence
satisÞes
G0
¡
k−
¢
+
£
k+ − k−¤G00 ¡k−¢ > G0 ¡k− + k+¢ > 0
as G0 is convex.
(ii) The second order cross derivatives of (2) and (3) are given by
∂2π−
∂k−∂k+
= − 1
k+
"Z k−+k+
k+
[θ − 2k−]
k+
dG (θ) +G0
¡
k− + k+
¢
k−
#
∂2π+
∂k+∂k−
= −G0 ¡k− + k+¢ < 0
Independently of the shape of the distribution function, the second-order cross derivative
of the small Þrm is negative for all k+ > 2k−. If G is convex the result also holds for
k+ ∈ [k−, 2k−]. Note that integration by parts allows to rewrite ∂2π−
∂k−∂k+ as − 1k+H(k−, k+),
where
H(k−, k+) =
k+ − k−
k+
£
G
¡
k− + k+
¢−G ¡k+¢¤+ k−
k+
G
¡
k+
¢
−
Z k−+k+
k+
G (θ)
k+
dθ +G0
¡
k− + k+
¢
k−
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Thus, H(k−, k+) > 0 if G0 (k− + k+) k− >
R k−+k+
k+
G(θ)
k+
dθ, which holds for a convex G asZ k−+k+
k+
G (θ)
k+
dθ ≤ k−G(k
− + k+)
k+
≤ k−G0 ¡k− + k+¢ ,
where the Þrst inequality follows from the Hermite-Hadamard inequality for convex func-
tions,18 and the second inequality follows from the properties of convex functions (G0(y +
a)y ≥ G(y + a)). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
Let ∆+ =
©
(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2 : x ≥ yª , and ∆− = ©(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2 : x ≤ yª . Fix x1, x2, y1, y2
in [0, 1] with x1 > x2 and y1 > y2. If all four points (x1, y1), (x1, y2), (x2, y1) and (x2, y2) lie
either in ∆+ or in ∆− then strict submodularity of the proÞt function follows from part ii)
of Lemma 1. If some of the four points lie in ∆+ and the rest in ∆−, then there are three
different cases to consider depending on the number of points in each region:
1.- (x1, y1), (x1, y2), (x2, y2) in ∆+ and (x2, y1) in ∆−, i.e., x1 > y1 > x2 > y2. Decreasing
differences requires
π+(x1, y1)− π+(x1, y2) < π−(x2, y1)− π+(x2, y2),
where π− and π+ have been deÞned in (2) and (3).
2.- (x1, y1), (x1, y2) in ∆+ and (x2, y1), (x2, y2) in ∆−, so that x1 > y1 > y2 > x2. Decreasing
differences requires
π+(x1, y1)− π+(x1, y2) < π−(x2, y1)− π−(x2, y2)
3.- (x1, y2) in ∆+ and (x1, y2), (x2, y1) and (x2, y2) in ∆−, so that y1 > x1 > y2 > x2. Now,
we have to show that
π−(x1, y1)− π+(x1, y2) < π−(x2, y1)− π−(x2, y2)
The proofs for the three cases are similar, thus we only provide here the one corresponding to
case 3, which is the most elaborated one.19 Let C stand for the right-hand side of inequality
above (π−(x2, y1)− π−(x2, y2)). It is easy to show that C exceeds the following expression,
C > −x2 [y1 − x2]
y1
G (y1)− x2
y1
x2Z
0
G (θ + y1) dθ +
x2 [y2 − x2]
y2
G (y2) +
x2
y2
x2Z
0
G (θ + y2) dθ.
18If f is convex then f
¡
a+b
2
¢ ≤ 1b−a R ba f(t) dt ≤ f(a)+f(b)2 ·
19The proofs for the remaining cases are available from the authors upon request.
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Let D denote the left-hand side of inequality above which is given by
D = −x1 [y1 − x1]
y1
G(y1) +
y1Z
x1
x1 [θ − x1]
θ
dG (θ) +
x1Z
0
·
G(θ + y2)− x1
y1
G (θ + y1)
¸
dθ
For C −D > 0, the following is sufficient
0 <
1
y1
[x1 [y1 − x1]− x2 [y1 − x2]]G(y1) +
x2Z
0
·
x1 − x2
y1
G (θ + y1)− y2 − x2
y2
G(θ + y2)
¸
dθ
+
x1Z
x2
x1
·
G (θ + y1)
y1
− G(θ + y2)
x1
¸
dθ +
x2 [y2 − x2]
y2
G (y2)−
y1Z
x1
x1 [θ − x1]
θ
dG (θ)
The convexity of the cdf yields G(θ+y1)
y1
≥ G(θ+y2)
y2
, which implies
x2Z
0
·
x1 − y2 + y2 − x2
y1
G (θ + y1)− y2 − x2
y2
G(θ + y2)
¸
dθ >
x2Z
0
x1 − y2
y1
G (θ + y1) dθ, and
x1
·
G (θ + y1)
y1
− G(θ + y2)
y2
¸
> x1
·
G (θ + y2)
y2
− G(θ + y2)
x1
¸
> G(θ + y2)
·
x1 − y2
y1
¸
Note also that integration by parts gives
x1 [y1 − x1]
y1
G(y1)−
y1Z
x1
x1 [θ − x1]
θ
dG (θ) =
y1Z
x1
x21
θ2
G (θ) dθ > 0
Thus, if it holds that
x2Z
0
x1 − y2
y1
G (θ + y1) dθ >
x2 [y1 − x2]
y1
G(y1),
then it will suffice to ensure C−D > 0. The convexity ofG and the fact thatG(0) = 0 implies
that the average function F (x) ≡
! x
0 G(t)dt
x
is starshaped (F (αx) ≤ αF (x) for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1),
consequently,
x2
h
x1−y2
y1
i x2R
0
G (θ + y1) dθ
x2
≥
x2
x2
"
x1−y2
y1
#R
0
G (θ + y1) dθh
x1−y2
y1
i
x2
=
y1
x1 − y2
x2
"
x1−y2
y1
#Z
0
G (θ + y1) dθ
Since y1
x1−y2 ≥
x2[y1−x2]
y1
, and G is increasing, the desired result follows.
Since the game is submodular, existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is guaranteed (see
Vives 1990). Q.E.D.
25
Proof of Proposition 5
(i) . Along the diagonal, the right-hand derivative is always larger than the left-hand deriv-
ative as
∂+π(k, k)
∂k+
− ∂
−π(k, k)
∂k−
=
Z 2k
k
2k − θ
k
dG (θ) > 0 (10)
for anyG.This implies that k is never a best reply to k and hence no pure strategy equilibrium
can be symmetric.
(ii) . a). Assuming that the second order derivative (6) is negative, the proÞt function (1) is
piecewise concave and continuous everywhere, in particular at k− = k+. Choose an arbitrary
but Þxed value for kj . Then, the payoff functions π−i (·, kj), π+i (·, kj) are single-peaked on the
interval [0, 1], with unconstrained maxima at R−i (kj) and R
+
i (kj) ,which solve (4) and (5).
Since the marginal revenue function jumps up at symmetric capacity pairs (see equation
(10)), to determine the global maxima we must distinguish three regions:
Region A. If ∂π
+(k,k)
∂k+
≥ ∂π−(k,k)
∂k− ≥ 0, R+i (kj) is interior and R−i (kj) is constrained. Thus,
the global maximum is R+i (kj) .
Region B. If ∂π
−(k,k)
∂k− ≤ ∂π
+(k,k)
∂k+
< 0, then R−i (kj) is interior and R
+
i (kj) is constrained.
Thus, the global maximum is R−i (kj) < kj.
Region C. If ∂π
+(k,k)
∂k+
≥ 0 and ∂π−(k,k)
∂k− ≤ 0, both R+i (kj) and R−i (kj) are interior, we need
hence to compare proÞts at the two candidate. For this purpose, let us Þrst implicitly deÞne
k∗ and k∗∗ as,
∂π−(k∗, k∗)
∂k−
= 0 and
∂π+ (k∗∗, k∗∗)
∂k+
= 0.
Given that (10) implies ∂π
+(k∗,k∗)
∂k+
> 0, it follows from the concavity of π+ that k∗∗ > k∗.
Using these deÞnitions, in region C the following equations are satisÞed,
π−i
¡
R−i (k
∗) , k∗
¢− π+i ¡R+i (k∗) , k∗¢ < 0
π−i
¡
R−i (k
∗∗) , k∗∗
¢− π+i ¡R+i (k∗∗) , k∗∗¢ > 0.
Furthermore, the difference in proÞts is a strictly increasing function of kj ∈ [k∗, k∗∗] ,
dπ−i
¡
R−i (kj) , kj
¢
dkj
− dπ
+
i
¡
R+i (kj) , kj
¢
dkj
=
Z R−i +kj
kj
1
k2j
h
k2j +
£
R−i
¤2 −R−i θi dG (θ)
+
£
G
¡
R+i + kj
¢−G ¡R−i + kj¢¤ > 0
as R+i > R
−
i and k
2
j +
£
R−i
¤2−R−i θ > k2j +£R−i ¤2−R−i £R−i + kj¤ > 0. Therefore, there exists
a unique k ∈ (k∗, k∗∗) such that
π−i
³
R−i
³
k
´
, k
´
− π+i
³
R+i
³
k
´
, k
´
= 0.
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At kj = k both R−i and R
+
i are a best reply. For values kj < k the best reply is R
+
i , whereas
for kj > k the best reply is R−i . In summary, the reaction functions for Þrm i = 1, 2, i 6= j,
are as follows:
Ri(kj) =
 R−i (kj) if kj ≥ kR+i (kj) if kj ≤ k
Notice that Ri(kj) is a continuous function everywhere except at one point, kj = k.
(ii). b). If G is convex both R−i (kj) and R
+
i (kj) are decreasing functions. Since R
−
i (
k) <
R+i (
k) and R+i (0) = G
−1 (1− c) < 1 and R−i (1) > 0, then they must cross outside the
discontinuity region, i.e., k− < k < k+, which guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium
((k−, k+)). Finally, since the best replies are identical for both players then (k1 = k+, k2 =
k−) is also an equilibrium as claimed.
If G is concave then R+i (kj) is a decreasing function, and R
−
i (kj) is also decreasing for all
kj > 2k
−
i .We Þrst note that a candidate to equilibrium always exists. Note that substracting
equation (5) from (4), a candidate to equilibrium is a pair
¡
k−i , k
+
j
¢
such that
k−i +k
+
jZ
k−i
θ − 2k−i
min(θ, k+j )
dG (θ) = 0 and k−i + k
+
j = G
−1 (1− c)
Let G−1 (1− c) = A and consider the function H(kj) : [A/2, A]→ R deÞned by
H(kj) =
AZ
A−kj
θ − 2 (A− kj)
min(θ, kj)
G0 (θ) dθ
Since H (A) > 0 and H
¡
A
2
¢
< 0, by appealing to Bolzano intermediate value theorem, there
exists k∗j ∈
¡
A
2
, A
¢
at which H(k∗j ) = 0. Taking k
−
1 = A − k∗2, then the pair (k−1 , k+2 = k∗2)
is a solution to system made of equations (5) and (4). Now this solution constitutes an
equilibrium if it lies outside the discontinuity region in the best reply functions. A sufficient
condition for the pair (k−1 , k
+
2 = k
∗
2) to be an equilibrium is that R
−
1 (2k
−
1 ) = k¯1 ≤ k1 where
k+2 (k1) = k2 = 2k1. To see this note that R
−
1 (2k
−
1 ) determines the crossing point between
the best reply R−1 (k2) and the line k2 = 2k1. For k2 > 2k
−
1 the best reply decreases as
∂2π−1
∂k1∂k2
becomes negative. Similarly, R+2 (k1) determines the crossing between the best reply R
+
2 (k1)
and the line k2 = 2k1. Thus if k¯1 ≤ k1 then (k−1 , k+2 = k∗2) lies outside the discontinuity
region.
Now for k¯1 ≤ k1 it must be the case that
2k¯1R¯
k1
³
2k¯1−θ
θ
´
dG (θ) +
3k¯1R
2k¯1
³
2k¯1−θ
2k¯1
´
dG (θ) ≥ 0, as,
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by deÞnition,
1− c = G(3k1) and
1− c = G(3k¯1) +
2k¯1Z
k¯1
2k¯1 − θ
θ
dG (θ) +
3k¯1Z
2k¯1
2k¯1 − θ
2k¯1
dG (θ) ,
and the right hand side of equalities above determines two strictly increasing functions
provided that the SOC holds. Thus if
2k¯1Z
k¯1
2k¯1 − θ
2k¯1
dG (θ) ≥
3k¯1Z
2k¯1
θ − 2k¯1
2k¯1
dG (θ)
then the result will follow as
2k¯1Z
k¯1
µ
2k¯1 − θ
θ
¶
G0 (θ) dθ ≥
2k¯1Z
k¯1
µ
2k¯1 − θ
2k¯1
¶
G0 (θ) dθ.
We next show that this is the case by using Steffensens Inequality.20 Since G0 (θ) is a
non-negative and monotone decreasing function and 0 ≤ θ−2k¯1
2k¯1
≤ 1 for all θ ∈ £2k¯1, 3k¯1¤ then
Z 3k¯1
3k¯1−d
dG (θ) ≤
3k¯1Z
2k¯1
θ − 2k¯1
2k¯1
dG (θ) ≤
2k¯1+dZ
2k¯1
dG (θ) , for d =
3k¯1Z
2k¯1
θ − 2k¯1
2k¯1
dθ =
k¯1
4
.
Consequently,
3k¯1Z
2k¯1
θ − 2k¯1
2k¯1
G0 (θ) dθ ∈
·
G(3k¯1)−G
µ
11
4
k¯1
¶
, G
µ
11
4
k¯1
¶
−G(2k¯1)
¸
, and similarly,
2k¯1Z
k¯1
2k¯1 − θ
2k¯1
G0 (θ) dθ ∈
·
G
¡
k¯1
¢−Gµ3
4
k¯1
¶
, G(2k¯1)−G
µ
7
4
k¯1
¶¸
.
Since concavity of G implies
G(k¯1)−G
µ
3
4
k¯1
¶
> G
µ
11
4
k¯1
¶
−G(2k¯1)
20Let f(x) be a nonnegative and monotonic decreasing function in [a, b] and h(x) such that 0 ≤ h(x) ≤ 1
in [a, b], then Z b
b−d
f (x) dx ≤
bZ
a
f(x)h(x)dx ≤
a+dZ
a
f (x) dx
where d =
bR
a
h(x)dx. See Gradshteyn and Ryzhik (2000), page 1099.
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the result follows. Finally, using the same reasoning as above it is straightforward to see
that k∗1 < k¯1, so that the two best replies cross outside the discontinuity region.
Finally, an equilibrium satisÞes 1−G ¡k−i + k+j ¢−c = 0. Consequently aggregate capacity
k−i + k
+
j equals G
−1(1− c). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
(i) Subgame perfect equilibrium aggregate capacity is given byKu = G−1 (1− c) in the game
with continuous demand uncertainty, and it is given byKc = E [θ] in the certainty equivalent
game. The difference Ku−Kc is strictly decreasing in c. Furthermore, limc→0 [Ku −Kc] > 0
and limc→1 [Ku −Kc] < 0. Hence, it follows that there must exist some bc such thatKu > Kc
if and only if c ∈ (0,bc) .
(ii) In the certainty equivalent game, subgame perfect equilibrium prices are equal to
consumers reservation price, so that consumer surplus is zero. In the game with continuous
demand uncertainty, prices are strictly below the reservation price for θ ∈ (0, G−1 (1− c)) ⊂
[0, 1] , so that consumer surplus is strictly positive. It follows that expected prices must be
lower and consumer surplus higher under demand uncertainty.
(iii) Let W u and W c denote subgame perfect equilibrium Welfare in the game with de-
mand uncertainty and in the certainty equivalent game, respectively. These can be expressed
as,
W u =
Z 1
0
min
£
θ,G−1 (1− c)¤ dG (θ)− cG−1 (1− c) ,
W c = [1− c]
Z 1
0
θdG (θ) .
With the difference being,
W u −W c = c £E [θ]−G−1 (1− c)¤− Z 1
G−1(1−c)
£
θ −G−1 (1− c)¤ dG (θ) .
The above expression is clearly negative if c ∈ (0,bc) , as the second term is negative and, by
point (i) above, the Þrst term is negative as well. Furthermore, since ∂[W
u−W c]
∂c
= E [θ] −
G−1 (1− c) > 0 for c ∈ (bc, 1) and limc→1 [W u −W c] = 0, it follows that W u < W c for all c.
Proof of Lemma 2
When demand is uniformly distributed, expected proÞts become,
π− =
k+
2
£
2− 2k− − k+¤ 2− k−
2− k+
k−
k+
− ck−, and
π+ =
k+
2
£
2− 2k− − k+¤− ck+.
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The Þrst order derivatives are
∂π−
∂k−
=
k−k+ − k+ − 6k− + 3 [k−]2 + 2
2− k+ − c,
∂π+
∂k+
=
£
1− k− − k+¤− c.
Along the diagonal,
∂+π(k, k)
∂k+
− ∂
−π(k, k)
∂k−
> 0 (11)
which rules out the existence of a symmetric equilibrium.
Clearly, the second order conditions are satisÞed. Furthermore, the second-order cross
derivatives are negative, which guarantees that Þrms reaction functions R−i (kj) and R
+
i (kj)
are downward sloping. Furthermore, sinceR−i (k) < R
+
i (
k), R+i (0) = 1−c < 1 andR−i (1) > 0,
then they must cross outside the discontinuity region, i.e., k− < k < k+, which guarantees
that a Nash equilibrium exists and that it is the solution to the system of Þrst order conditions
above,
k+ =
1
2
h√
3c2 + 4c+ 2− 3c
i
and k− = [1− c]− 1
2
h√
3c2 + 4c+ 2− 3c
i
Q.E.D.
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